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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court

of Appeals pursuant

to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code

Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S CONVICTION OF
DAWN SWEAZEY ON FIVE COUNTS OF VARIOUS
ZONING AND HEALTH CODE VIOLATIONS; AND,
HAS
SWEAZEY FAILED TO MARSHAL
THE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JURY'S VERDICT?

Standard of Review:

When examining the sufficiency of the

evidence in a criminal trial, the appellate court should review the
evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury, and should
only

reverse

a

conviction

when

the

evidence

is

sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed
the crime of which she was convicted.

State

v. Gibson,

352 (Utah App. 1995).
The Utah Court of Appeals has also stated:
In order to bring a claim of insufficiency of
evidence, an appellant "must marshal the
evidence supporting the . . . findings and
demonstrate how the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient
to
support
the
disputed
findings." State v. Peterson,
841 P.2d 21, 25
(Utah App. 1992) .
Failure to marshal the
evidence waives an appellant's right to have
his claim of insufficiency considered on
1

908 P.2d

appeal.
State
v.
(Utah App. 1990).
State

v.

Gallegos,
II.

Moore,

802 P.2d 732, 738

851 P.2d 1185, 1189-1190 (Utah App. 1993).

IS SECTION 7-2-117(2) OF THE WEST VALLEY
CITY CODE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

Standard of Review:

This issue was not raised below, and

should be reviewed under the "plain error" standard.
To establish plain error, defendant must show
that: "(i) An error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court;
and (iii) the error is harmful."
State
v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).
An
error is harmful if, "absent the error, there
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome" for the defendant, or "our confidence
in the verdict is undermined." Id. at 120809.
State

v. Perez,

946 P.2d 724, 728 (Utah App. 1997).

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING THE
JURY TO BE TOLD THAT CERTAIN PHOTOGRAPHS
PLACED INTO EVIDENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN ON
THE VIOLATION DATE, JANUARY 27, 1995,
BECAUSE THE CITY HAD STIPULATED TO SAID
DATE, WHEN, IN FACT, IT WAS KNOWN TO BOTH
PARTIES AND THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
PHOTOGRAPHS WERE NOT TAKEN ON JANUARY 27,
1995, AND THAT THE STIPULATION HAD BEEN
MADE IN ERROR?
Standard of Review:
court

to

Velasquez,

set

aside

It is within the discretion of the trial

stipulations

672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).

of

the

parties.

v.

Therefore, this issue should

be reviewed on a "abuse of discretion" standard.

2

State

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
See

Addendum

for the following determinative

statutes and

ordinances:
Utah State Code (1995)
§ 10-9-804. Maps and plats required.
West Valley City Code (1995)
§ 7-1-103. Definitions.
§ 7-2-113. Measurement of Setback.
§ 7-2-117. Fences.
§ 7-6-303. Permitted Uses.
§ 7-6-305. Minimum Lot and Setback Requirements.
§ 24-2-111. Accumulation of Solid Waste and Littering.
§ 24-8-105. Real Property to Be Kept Clean and Secured.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE

OF THE

CASE

This case involves prosecution and conviction in the Third
Judicial District Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, for the following violations:
Count

WVC Code Violation

1

7-1-108
Building Permit

Infraction

(*)

2

7-1-108
Building Permit

Infraction

(*)

3

7-2-111
Clear View of Intersection

Infraction

(*)

3

Penalty Type

Count

WVC Code Violation

Penalty Type

4

7-2-117
Fence

Infraction

5

7-6-305
Minimum Lot Setback

Infraction

6

7-6-303
Permitted Use, Single-Family
Residential Zone

Infraction

7

24-2-111
Accumulation of Solid Waste

Class B Misdemeanor

8

24-2-111
Accumulation of Solid Waste

Class B Misdemeanor

9

24-8-105
Real Property Kept Clean

Class B Misdemeanor

(*)
COURSE OF

=

dismissed

PROCEEDINGS

Prosecution in this case was commenced by the filing of an
Information

against

Record, p. 1.
and

Defendant

Dawn Sweazey on March

27, 1995.

On May 1, 1995, Sweazey filed a Jury Trial Demand

Defendant's

Discovery Requests.

Record, pp. 4 and

6.

A

pretrial conference was held before Judge William A. Thorne on
October 3, 1995; however, the case was not resolved and was set for
jury trial.
heard

Sweazey filed several pretrial motions, which were

before

Judge

Thorne

on

October

30,

1995;

before

Judge Judith S. Atherton on December 12, 1995, and January 22,
1996;

and

Following

before
the

Judge

motion

Carlos

A.

hearings,

Information on March 21, 1996.

Esqueda
the

City

on March
filed

Record, pp. 88-89.

4

11, 1996.
an

Amended

On August 21, 1996, a jury trial on the charges set forth in
the Amended Information was held before Judge Ronald E. Nehring.
Judge Nehring dismissed Charges 1, 2, and 3, and, at the conclusion
of the trial, the jury found Sweazey guilty of the remaining six
charges.

Sweazey filed Defendants Motion for Judgment Notwith-

standing the Verdict on September 3, 1996.

Record, p. 153.

At a

hearing held on September 30, 1996, Judge Nehring denied Sweazey's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and her Motion for
a New Trial and sentenced Sweazey as set forth below.
DISPOSITION

IN

TRIAL

COURT

On August 21, 1996, a jury convicted Sweazey of Counts 4
through 9 and imposed the following fines and assessments:
Count

Fine/Assessment

4

$40 fine

5

$40 fine

6

$40 fine

7

$250 fine ($200 suspended);
180 days jail (suspended)

8

$250 fine ($200 suspended);
180 days jail (suspended)

9

$250 fine ($200 suspended);
180 days jail (suspended)

Record, p. 163.

Sweazey filed her Notice of Appeal with the Court

of Appeals on November 4, 1996.

Record, p. 166.

5

STATEMENT

1.

OF

FACTS

Dawn Sweazey is the owner of a residential house and lot

located at 7174 West Tenway, West Valley City, Utah.

Transcript,

p. 39, lines 8-10; p. 57, lines 23-26; p. 58, line 1.
2.

On

January

27, 1994, the West Valley City

Ordinance

Enforcement Division received a complaint of inoperable vehicles,
debris, and a trailer full of yard debris located on Sweazeyfs
property.
3.

Transcript, p. 40, lines 5-12.
Officer Terri Nordell of the West Valley City Ordinance

Enforcement Division viewed the property on February 1, 1994, and
attempted to serve Sweazey with a violation notice, which Sweazey
refused to accept.
4.
over

the

Transcript, p. 40, lines 12-22.

Following several follow-up visits and written notices
course

of

1994, Sweazey

exercised

her

right

to

an

administrative hearing regarding the condition of her property.
The

administrative

hearing

was

held

on

December

6,

1994.

Transcript, p. 52, lines 17-26; p. 53, lines 1-9.
5.
to

Following the administrative hearing, Sweazey was ordered

correct

certain

conditions

Transcript, p. 54, lines

existing

on

13-26; p. 55, lines

her

property.

1-26;

and Trial

Exhibit 12.
6.

Officer Nordell visited the property on January 16, 1995,

and found that Sweazey had not complied with the terms of the
notice.

Officer Nordell took certain photographs that were marked

6

as trial Exhibits 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17.

Transcript, p. 56,

lines 1-21; p. 58, lines 2-7.
7.

Officer

Nordell

returned

to the Sweazey

property

on

January 27, 1995, and observed the property to be essentially in
the same condition as it was on January 16, 1995.

Transcript,

p. 60, lines 1-7.
8.

On

March

27,

1995,

the

City

filed

an

Information,

charging Sweazey with violations observed by Officer Nordell on
January 27, 1995.
9.

No photographs

actually

taken by Officer

Nordell

on

January 27, 1995, were entered into evidence at trial; however,
based on the trial court's ruling to enforce an earlier stipulation
by the City, it was inaccurately represented to the jury that the
photographs comprising Exhibits 19 through 23 at trial were taken
on January 27, 1995.

Transcript, pp. 4-21.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

I.

Sweazey

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE CITY WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S GUILTY
VERDICT ON EACH CHARGE, AND SWEAZEY
FAILED TO MARSHAL THAT EVIDENCE IN HER
BRIEF.
relies

on

the photographs

Exhibits 19 through 23 at trial.

that

were

admitted

as

The photographs purport to show

the Sweazey property in a condition that does not violate the
ordinances

with

which

she

was

charged.

She

now

uses

these

photographs to argue that insufficient evidence exists to convict
7

her of the charges.

Her argument is without merit, since the

photographs are not competent evidence.

It was known to both

parties and the trial court that the photographs were not taken on
the violation date, January 27, 1995, but, rather, were taken
sometime before that date.
the

jury

was

informed

Based on a ruling by the trial court,

that

the

parties

had

stipulated

the

photographs were taken on January 27, 1995, even though everyone
but the jury knew that that was not a factual statement.
Despite the confusion regarding the date of the photographs,
competent

testimonial

evidence, which

was not

inconclusive

or

inherently improbable and which supports the jury!s verdicts of
guilty

on Counts

4 through

9 of the Amended

Information, was

presented to the jury.
Sweazey
requirements
neglected

has failed to comply with the Court's
in

her

Brief.

to marshal

In making

virtually

all

of

her
the

marshaling

argument,
evidence

Sweazey

presented

supporting the jury's verdicts. By failing to marshal the evidence
against

her,

Sweazey

has

waived

her

right

to

raise

an

to specify with any particularity

the

"insufficiency of the evidence" claim on appeal.
II.

Sweazey

SECTION 7-2-117(2) OF THE WEST VALLEY
CITY CODE REGARDING SETBACKS OF SIDE YARD
FENCES IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
has

failed

section of the West Valley City ordinances she believes
unconstitutional.

to be

She has also failed to describe which provision

8

of the Constitution it offends and which Constitution, the United
States Constitution or the Utah Constitution, she is referring to.
Finally, Sweazey fails to assert any credible basis for a finding
of unconstitutionality.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THE
PARTIES TO A STIPULATION THAT HAD BEEN
BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT AND, THEREBY,
CAUSED MISINFORMATION TO BE PRESENTED TO
THE JURY.
Prior

to

trial,

the

City

had

stipulated

that

certain

photographs, later marked as Exhibits 19 through 23, had been taken
on the alleged violation date, January 27, 1995.

Prior to trial,

it became apparent that the stipulation was based on a mistake of
fact, and that the photographs had not been taken on January 27,
1995, but sometime prior to that date.

Despite the mistake of

fact, the trial court ruled that the City would be held to the
stipulation.
the actual

This resulted in the jury's being misinformed as to
date the photographs were taken.

The

trial

court

clearly had the power to set aside the stipulation based on a
mistake of fact, yet failed to do so.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE CITY WAS
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S GUILTY
VERDICT ON EACH CHARGE, AND SWEAZEY
FAILED TO MARSHAL THAT EVIDENCE IN HER
BRIEF.

Appellant Dawn Sweazey1s consistent theme throughout her Brief
is that the evidence presented to the jury was contradicted by
9

certain photographs and, therefore, was insufficient to support her
convictions.

In pursuing her argument, she relies on a series of

photographs, Exhibits 19 through 23, that were presented at trial.
The photographs purport to show the Sweazey property in a nonviolatmg condition on the date the violations are alleged to have
occurred, January 27, 1995.
photographs

is

without

competent evidence.

However, Sweazey's reliance on the

merit,

since

the

photographs

are

not

It is clear from pretrial argument that both

parties and the trial court judge were aware that the photographs
had not been taken on January 27,1995, but, rather, sometime prior
to that date.

Even if the photographs were competent evidence, the

mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal of
a conviction.

State

v.

Warden,

813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).

At a previous proceeding, the City had erroneously stipulated
that the photographs comprising Exhibits 19 through 23 had been
taken

on

the violation

date.

This error was brought

to the

attention of the trial court immediately prior to trial, and a
lengthy argument ensued regarding the presentation of the exhibits
to the jury.

Transcript, pp. 4-21.

Following the argument, the

trial court judge ruled that the City would have to stand by its
previous stipulation, and that the jury would be told that the City
had stipulated that Exhibits 19 through 23 were photographs that
had been taken on January 27, 1995.
24.

Transcript, p. 20, lines 12-

The ruling was made with the trial court's full knowledge that

10

the stipulation was in error.

Transcript, p. 8, lines 10-18;

p. 22, lines 18-20; p. 23, lines 2-11.

Even Sweazey admits in her

Brief that "photos 19 through 23 fail to show the status of the
property as of the alleged violation date of January 27, 1995."
Appellant!s Brief, p. 12, lines 2-3.
Given the obvious confusion caused by telling the jury the
incorrect date of the photographs, it is not surprising that the
jury chose to rely on the other evidence presented at trial.

On

each count, there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury to
sustain a conviction.

The evidence can be summarized as follows.

COUNT 4: "FENCE" VIOLATION
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 7-2-117(2))
"DEFENDANT FAILED TO KEEP A 20 FOOT SETBACK FROM THE
FRONT OF HER PROPERTY AND INSTEAD HAS A 5 FT SOLID FENCE
BUILT UP TO THE SIDEWALK."
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89.
The City!s witness at trial was Officer Terrie Nordell of the
West Valley City Ordinance Enforcement Division.

Officer Nordell

testified that a front yard setback, for the purposes of the City's
ordinance,

is

considered

from the

front

of

sidewalk, from property line to property line.
lines 1-2.

the

house

to

the

Transcript, p. 62,

She also testified that the ordinance requires that

within the 20-foot setback, a fence or wall must be at least 50
percent open, or, in the alternative, can only be two feet high.
Transcript, p. 58, lines 15-17.
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The height and location of the "fence" (which is actually a
solid,

cinder

block

wall)

Officer

Nordell

testified

was

that

uncontroverted

the

height

of

at

the

trial.

fence

was

approximately four and a half feet (Transcript, p. 59, lines 1218),

and that it was present on January 27, 1995

p. 61, lines 9-11).

(Transcript,

Finally, Sweazey stipulated at trial that the

fence was four feet in height and extended along the side yard
boundary

of the property, all the way to the

front

sidewalk.

Transcript, p. 46, lines 13-17; p. 58, lines 22-25.
The evidence presented at trial with regard
violation

is not

inconclusive

or inherently

to the

improbable

fence
and is

sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
COUNT 5: "MINIMUM LOT SETBACK" VIOLATION
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 7-6-305(1))
"DEFENDANT HAS BLOCKS AND A BOX CAR IN THE SET BACK AREA
OF HER PROPERTY."
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89.
The testimony of Officer Nordell at trial provided sufficient
evidence that a "boxcar" was present within the front yard setback
on January 27, 1995.
boxcar

was

present

First, Officer Nordell testified that the
when

she

visited

the

property

and

took

photographs on January 16, 1995.

Transcript, p. 58, lines 2-7.

She

visited

further

testified

that

she

the

property

on

the

violation date, January 27, 1995, and that the conditions had not
changed since her visit on January 16. Transcript, p. 60, lines 1-

12

7.

Finally, Officer Nordell testified that the boxcar was located

between seven and ten feet from the sidewalk, clearly within the
area she had previously testified comprised the front yard setback
of the Sweazey home.

Transcript, p. 62, lines 9-17.

The evidence presented by the City with regard to the minimum
lot setback violation is not inconclusive or inherently improbable
and is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
COUNT 6: "PERMITTED USE" VIOLATION
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 7-6-303)
"DEFENDANT IS STORING A LARGE BOX CAR ON HER PROPERTY
WHEN SUCH IS NOT PERMITTED IN A RESIDENTIAL ZONE."
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89.
Officer

Nordellfs

testimony

regarding

the

presence

and

location of the boxcar on the Sweazey property on January 27, 1995,
has been outlined above.

Officer Nordell also testified that the

location of the boxcar on the Sweazey property was not a permitted
use in an R-l-6 (Residential) Zone.
21.

Transcript, p. 62, lines 18-

Finally, Officer Nordell testified that she had access to the

permits that would had to have been issued in order to legally move
the boxcar onto the property.

Transcript, p. 60, lines 23-24.

Officer Nordell stated that she had checked those permits, that a
permit had not been issued to Sweazey, and, therefore, that the
boxcar

had

been

moved

onto

the

property

without

a

permit.

Transcript, p. 60, lines 20-26; p. 61, lines 1-6; p. 62, lines 1823.

13

The evidence presented by the City at trial with regard to the
permitted

use

violation

is

not

inconclusive

or

inherently

improbable and is sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.
COUNT 7: "ACCUMULATION OF SOLID WASTE" VIOLATION
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 24-2-111)
"DEFENDANT ACCUMULATED, THREW, DISCARDED, DEPOSITED,
PLACED, SWEPT, DUMPED, CONDUCTED OR ALLOWED ANOTHER TO DO
THE SAME ON HER PROPERTY, TREE LIMBS, BROKEN BRICKS AND
ASSORTED OTHER TRASH."
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89.
There
finding

was

that

ample

evidence

presented

at

trial

bricks, wood, and other trash were

Sweazey property.

to

support

located

Transcript, p. 56, lines 1-6; p. 57, lines 10-12.
in

the

the

With regard to bricks, Officer Nordell testified

that the pile of broken bricks was present on January

shown

on

a

photographs

marked

as

Exhibits

16, 1995.

The bricks are

13,

14,

and

15.

Officer Nordell also testified that the bricks were present when
she visited the property on the violation date, January 27, 1995
(Transcript, p.

63, lines 7-17)

and were even present

when

she

visited the property sometime after the violation date (Transcript,
p. 67, lines 2-4) .
It was

also

Officer

Nordell ! s

testimony

that

she

other

solid waste when she viewed the property on the

date,

January

27,

1995.

She

stated

that

she

observed
violation

observed

an

old

dishwasher, kitchen chairs, and some wood mixed in with the bricks.
Transcript, p. 63, lines 7-26; p. 64, lines 1-8.

14

The

evidence

presented

at

trial

with

regard

to

the

"accumulation of solid waste" violation is not inconclusive or
inherently improbable and is sufficient to sustain the verdict of
the jury.
COUNT 8: "ACCUMULATION OF SOLID WASTE" VIOLATION
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 24-2-111)
"DEFENDANT HAS ON HER PROPERTY 2 UNLICENSED OR INOPERABLE
VEHICLES AND VEHICLE PARTS."
Amended Information - Record, pp. 88-89.
This

charge

inoperable
Officer

of accumulation

vehicles

Nordell

located

testified

that

of solid waste
on

the

when

she

was based

Sweazey
visited

on

property.
the

Sweazey

property on January 16, 1995, one of the vehicles in question, a
Camaro,

was on the property behind the boxcar.

lines 18-19.

Transcript, p. 64,

She testified that the other two vehicles that had

been on the property had been moved across the street to Sweazey's
son's property and were still licensed and inoperable. Transcript,
p. 64, lines 19-21.

Officer Nordell also testified that when she

visited the property on the violation date, January 27, 1995, the
property

and

the

January 16 visit.

violations

thereon

were

unchanged

from

her

Transcript, p. 60, lines 1-7.

Based on the foregoing, the jury had sufficient evidence to
conclude that the Camaro was located on the Sweazey property on
January 27, 1995, thereby providing sufficient evidence to support
the verdict of the jury.
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COUNT 9: "REAL PROPERTY KEPT CLEAN" VIOLATION
(WEST VALLEY CITY CODE § 24-8-105(4))
"DEFENDANT HAS OR MAINTAINS ON HER PROPERTY UNSIGHTLY OR
DELETERIOUS OBJECTS OR STRUCTURES ON THE PROPERTY WHICH
SHE OWNS OR RESIDES."
Amended Information - Record, p. 88-89.
The parties had stipulated that Sweazey is the owner of the
property.

Transcript, p. 57, lines 23-26; p. 58, line 1.

Also, it

is uncontroverted that Sweazey received notice that her property
was in violation, and that she was required to clean it. A copy of
the notice was presented as evidence and marked as Exhibit 12.
Transcript, p. 54, lines 13-26.

Officer Nordell testified that

Sweazey had been given notice to clean the property and had failed
to do so.

Transcript, p. 64, lines 22-26; p. 65, lines 1-3.

This

is further substantiated by Officer Nordell's testimony, which is
set forth above, with regard to the inoperable vehicles, bricks,
appliances, chairs, and wood, which she has previously testified
were still present on the property on the violation date.
The evidence presented with regard to the real property kept
clean violation is not inconclusive or inherently improbable and is
sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
Virtually all of the evidence presented above is absent from
Sweazey's Brief.

Sweazey has utterly failed to comply with the

previous rulings of this Court requiring an appellant to marshal
all of the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate
16

how,

even given that evidence, the jury has come to the wrong

conclusion.

This Court has repeatedly stated that in order to

properly marshal the evidence, the appellant must present every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial that supports the
findings the appellant is disputing.
Storage

and

Warehouse,

Inc.,

Oneida/SLIC

v.

Oneida

872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994).

Cold
In

this case, the Appellant has fallen woefully short of meeting the
marshaling

requirement.

That

failure provides

an

ground to sustain the verdicts reached by the jury.

independent

By failing to

marshal the evidence, the Appellant has waived her right to have a
claim of insufficiency of evidence considered on appeal.
Gallegos,

State

v.

851 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1993).

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that for each and every
count upon which the jury reached a verdict of guilty, there was
sufficient competent evidence presented at trial to support that
verdict.

Also, it is obvious that Sweazey has utterly failed to

meet the marshaling

requirements

set forth by this Court and,

therefore, has waived her right to raise an insufficiency of the
evidence claim on appeal.
II.

SECTION 7-2-117(2) OF THE WEST VALLEY
CITY CODE REGARDING SETBACKS OF SIDE YARD
FENCES IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Sweazey contends, in Argument "A" of her Brief

(Appellant's

Brief, p. 9 ) , that the West Valley City ordinance regarding fence
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setbacks

is

unconstitutional.

Her

argument

is

wholly

without

merit.
Sweazey

fails

to

unconstitutional.

specify

She

makes

which
a

ordinance

vague

she

reference

contends
to

a

is

"prior

subsection" specifying that property lines shall be designated on
the

"official" plats

kept by the County Recorder.

Brief, p. 9, lines 10-11.

Appellant's

The Appellee has been unable to locate

a West Valley City ordinance defining the front yard setback that
defines "property line" as Sweazey describes.

To the contrary, the

appropriate measurement is from the right-of-way line as shown on
the official map, which is defined at Section 7-1-103(119)

of the

West Valley City Code, or from the existing right-of-way line.

The

ordinance that governs the measurement of setbacks is Section 7-2113 of

the West Valley City Code, which

specifically

states

as

follows:
7-2-113. MEASUREMENT OF SETBACK.
Wherever a front yard is required for a
lot facing on a street for which an official
map has been recorded in the office of the
County Recorder, the depth of such front yard
shall be measured from the mapped street line
provided by the official map.
Where an
official
map
has
not
been
recorded,
measurements shall be made from the existing
right-of-way line or from the proposed rightof-way line, as indicated on the major street
plan.
In this case, Officer Nordell testified that she
the sidewalk to be the front setback line.
public

right-of-way,

it

is

apparent
18

that

considered

Since sidewalks
Officer

Nordell

are
was

measuring from the existing right-of-way line.

Since both the

testimony and the stipulation of the parties established that the
fence

ran along the side yard property

line right up

to the

sidewalk, there is little possibility that any reasonable person
would not understand that it lies within the front yard setback
area.
Sweazey fails to specify which section of the Constitution or
even which Constitution, the United States Constitution or the Utah
Constitution, she feels is being violated.

However, she seems to

contend that plats recorded by the County Recorder cannot establish
property lines.
established

This is obviously not true.

method

of

establishing

Plats are a well

property

boundaries,

particularly when subdividing larger parcels of property into lots.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-804 (1953).

Furthermore, it has long been

recognized that, "Where there is a recorded plat, the conveyance of
land by designation of lot number and block number and name of the
plat or subdivision passes the title of the grantors the same as if
such lots had been described by metes and bounds."
Ogden City,

Hall

v.

North

166 P.2d 221 (Utah 1946).

Sweazey has failed to provide this Court with a description of
the very subsection she believes to be defective, a description of
the Constitution and/or constitutional provision she believes to be
violated, and any credible argument as to why such
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subsection

should be found unconstitutional.

This Court should disregard

Sweazey's argument and affirm the verdicts of the jury.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THE
PARTIES TO A STIPULATION THAT HAD BEEN
BASED ON A MISTAKE OF FACT AND, THEREBY,
CAUSED MISINFORMATION TO BE PRESENTED TO
THE JURY.
West Valley City believes that much of the confusion in this
case is the result of an erroneous ruling by the trial court judge.
That ruling allowed incompetent evidence to come before the jury,
and the incompetent evidence forms the basis for much of Sweazey's
argument in her appeal.
The problem arose when, at a prior deposition and in a hearing
before the court, the West Valley City Prosecutor stipulated that
the photographs that eventually became Exhibits 19 through 23 had
been taken on the violation date, January 27, 1995.

Upon reviewing

the file with the Ordinance Enforcement Officer prior to trial, it
became apparent that the stipulation was based on a mistake of
fact, and that the photographs could not have been taken on that
date.

Immediately prior to trial, Sweazey argued to the court that

since the City had previously stipulated that the photographs were
taken

on

the

stipulation,

violation
and

the

date, the

jury must

be

City must
told

that

be

held

the

to

that

photographs

represented the condition of the property on January 27, 1995.
This

was

clearly

to

Sweazey's

of

the

photographs showed the violations absent from the property.

The
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advantage,

since

many

City urged the court to set aside the stipulation and allow the
accurate date of the photographs to be presented to the jury.
It is apparent from the transcript of the hearing that both
parties and the court were aware that the stipulation was in error.
Transcript,

pp.

4-21.

Initially,

it

was

inclination to set aside the stipulation.

the

trial

court's

The court stated:

I find, however, that in my view we are here
in part to seek the truth. And it would be
also offensive to me if the photographs were
introduced into evidence in this trial and it
were placed on the record that the photographs
were taken on a date that everyone knew wasn't
the right date of the photograph and, in fact,
the photographs were communicating to the jury
an inaccurate picture of whatever they were
supposed to portray and we all knew it except
the jury by virtue of a ruling of estoppel.
Transcript, p. 8, lines 10-18.
Ultimately, however, the trial court, apparently believing it
to be legally bound to accept the stipulation, ruled that the jury
would be told the incorrect date of the photographs.

The court

stated, "I am going to find that the City is going to be bound by
its stipulation relative to the dates of the photographs and may
not at the trial
stipulation."

introduce evidence of dates contrary

Transcript, p. 20, lines 12-15.

continuing objection to this ruling.

to the

The City had a

Transcript, p. 20, lines 25-

26.
The ruling of the trial court was clearly in error.
establishes

that

trial

courts
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have

the

power

to

Utah law
set

aside

stipulations entered into advertently or for justifiable cause.
Dove v.

Cude,

710 P.2d 170 (Utah 1985).

Furthermore, mistakes of

fact have specifically been found to be a valid ground for setting
aside

stipulations

Velasquez,

in

appropriate

circumstances.

State

v.

672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).

In this case, West Valley City asserts that the trial court
judge abused his discretion by failing to set aside the erroneous
stipulation of the parties, thereby allowing inaccurate evidence to
be presented to the jury.
the

inaccurate

It is now the erroneous stipulation and

photographs

that

form

the basis

"inadequacy of the evidence" argument on appeal.

for

Sweazey's

West Valley City

believes the trial court's decision to be harmless error and that
the jury verdicts were adequately supported by other competent
evidence, but

the City urges this Court to examine

the

trial

court's ruling in its decision in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that
Sweazey's appeal be denied, and that her convictions be affirmed.
DATED this 5th day of February, 1998.

WEST VALLEY CITY

J. M3ichard Catten, Senior Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES:

UTAH CODE (1995)

DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES:

WEST VALLEY CITY CODE (1995)

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
UTAH CODE (1995)

10-9-804.
Maps and plats required.
(1) Whenever any lands are laid out and platted, the owner of those lands shall cause an
accurate map or plat to be made of them that sets forth and describes:
(a) all the parcels of ground laid out and platted, by their boundaries, course, and
extent, and whether they are intended for streets or other public uses, together with any areas
that are reserved for public purposes; and
(b) all blocks and lots intended for sale, by numbers, and their precise length and
width.
(2)
(a) The owner of the land shall acknowledge the map or plat before an officer
authorized by law to take the acknowledgement of conveyances of real estate.
(b) The surveyor making the map or plat shall certify it.
(c) The legislative body shall approve the map or plat as provided in this part.
(3) After the map or plat has been acknowledged, certified, and approved, the owner of the
land shall file and record it in the county recorder's office in the county in which the lands platted
and laid out are situated.
1991

DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES
WEST VALLEY CITY CODE (1995)

7-1-103.
DEFINITIONS.
Whenever any words or phrases used in this Title are not defined herein, but are defined in
related sections of the Utah Code or in the Subdivision Ordinance, such definitions are incorporated
herein and shall apply as though set forth herein in full, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention. Words not defined in any Code shall have their ordinarily accepted meanings within the
context in which they are used.
Unless a contrary intention clearly appears, words used in the present tense include the future,
the singular includes the plural, the term "shall" is always mandatory, and the term "may" is
permissive. The following terms as used in this Title shall have the respective meanings hereinafter
set forth.
(119) "Official Map" means the public street map adopted by the City Council as provided
in Title 10, Chapter 9, Sections 23 through 25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

7-2-113.
MEASUREMENT OF SETBACK.
Wherever a front yard is required for a lot facing on a street for which an official map has
been recorded in the office of the County Recorder, the depth of such front yard shall be measured
from the mapped street line provided by the official map. Where an official map has not been
recorded, measurements shall be made from the existing right-of-way line or from the proposed
right-of-way line, as indicated on the major street plan.
7-2-117.
FENCES.
(1) A six-foot fence of any material may be constructed on or within property lines, as shown
on the official plats maintained in the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, in side and rear
yards. This shall include side yards of corner lots, provided clear view of intersections can be
maintained as outlined in Section 7-2-111.
(2) In front yards, a 20-foot setback from the front property line shall be maintained for
fences over four feet in height. Fences four feet or less in height, which are at least 50 percent
transparent, may be allowed up to the front property line or, if sidewalk exists, up to the sidewalk.
No solid fence over two feet in height shall be allowed closer than 20 feet to the front property line.
(3) Fence Height. Where there is a difference in the grade of the properties on either side of
a fence or wall, the height of the fence or wall shall be measured from the average grade of the
higher property. Average grade shall be established based on elevations of finish grade within 5 feet
of the proposed fence line. When a retaining wall exists at the property line, fence height may be
measured from the higher side of the wall.
(4) Fire Hydrants. When a fire hydrant is located on or near a property line, it shall be given
a clear buffer area around the hydrant of at least three feet in order to promote easy access to the plug
for fire protection. A fire hydrant shall not be enclosed by fencing.

(5) When requested, the Zoning Administrator may grant a waiver or modification of any
height requirements of this section upon finding that the waiver or modification will not circumvent
the intent of the requirements. Any person may appeal the Zoning Administrator's decision pursuant
to Section 7-18-104. If the Zoning Administrator so desires, he may submit the request for a waiver
or modification directly to the Board of Adjustment for their determination.
7-6-303.
PERMITTED USES.
The following are permitted uses in all single-family residential zones; no other permitted
uses are allowed, except as provided in Section 7-2-114:
(1) Agriculture
(2) Community Uses
(3) Home occupations - Minor
(4) Household pets
(5) Signs (see Title 11 - Sign Ordinance)
(6) Single-family dwellings
(7) Uses customarily accessory to listed permitted uses
7-6-305.
MINIMUM LOT AND SETBACK REQUIREMENTS.
(1) The following shall be the minimum lot areas, widths and setbacks in single-family
residential zones:
Zone

Lot
Area

Lot
Width

F

S

S

DG/C
Side

SG/C
Side

R

R-l-4

4,000 S.F.

50'

25'

0'

30'

10'

20'

20'

R-l-6

6,000 S.F.

65'

25'

6'

30'

10'

20'

30'

R-l-7

7,000 S.F.

70'

25'

8'

30'

10'

20'

30'

R-1-8

8,000 S.F.

80'

25'

8'

30'

10'

20'

30'

R-l-10

10,000 S.F.

90'

30*

8*

30'

10'

20'

30'

F = Front
R = Rear
S = Side
DG/C = Double Garage/Carport
SG/C = Single Garage/Carport
(2) For lots with an attached double-car garage or double carport, the side yard adjacent to
the double-car garage or double carport can be reduced to 10 feet. For lots with an attached singlecar garage or single carport, the side yard adjacent to the single-car garage or single carport can be
reduced to 20 feet. The rear yard may be reduced to a minimum of 20 feet.
(3) For homes existing as of the effective date of this ordinance, April 18,1990, the side yard
setback adjacent to a one-story double-car garage, at least 18 feet wide, may be reduced to a
minimum of four feet provided the maximum width of the garage is 20 feet and the four-foot side

yard is hard surfaced. The garage shall continually function as a storage area for vehicles and cannot
be converted to living space for a dwelling.
(4) The width of lots on cul-de-sacs shall be measured at the front setback line. Such widths
may be reduced a maximum of five feet from widths listed above.
(5) The width of corner lots shall be increased by 10 feet from the minimum width listed
above. The minimum side yard abutting a public or private street shall be 20 feet.
(6) Accessory buildings may be located in the rear yard to within one foot of the side and rear
property lines, provided the building is at least six feet to the rear of the dwelling, does not encroach
on any recorded easements, and occupies no more than 25 percent of the rear yard, and is located no
closer than 10 feet to a dwelling on an adjacent lot. On double frontage lots or corner lots, accessory
buildings shall not be allowed within 20 feet of any dedicated street.
24-2-111.
ACCUMULATION OF SOLID WASTE AND LITTERING.
(1) Accumulation of solid waste and littering prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person
to accumulate, throw, discard, deposit, place, sweep, dump, conduct or allow any person to
accumulate, throw, discard, deposit, place, sweep, dump or conduct any solid waste or litter into or
upon any public place, private premises, street, road, alley, property abutting any alley, stream, well,
spring, canal, ditch, gutter, lot or any other property or place, above or below ground level, except:
(a)
This section shall not apply to waste thrown, deposited or placed in
containers meeting the requirements of these regulations and provided for the
person's use, or a facility or site approved by the Department.
(b)
This section shall not apply to Department-approved spreading of manure or
other materials upon the land for fertilizing or conditioning the soil, provided
a nuisance or health hazard is not created.
(c)
This section does not preclude solid waste from being temporarily
accumulated for immediate removal, if approved by the Department.
(d)
This section does not preclude the construction or operation of a compost
pile, as provided in (5) of this Section.
(e)
This section does not apply to junk and scrap metal accumulated on the
premises of a business enterprise lawfully situated and licensed for the same,
if a nuisance or health hazard is not created. (11.1)
(2) Abandoned, junked, or inoperable vehicles.
(a)
It shall be unlawful for any person to abandon a vehicle upon any highway or
public or private property without the express or implied consent of the
owner or person in lawful possession or control of the property. For the
purpose of this section, a vehicle shall be presumed to be abandoned if it is
left unattended on a highway for a period in excess of 24 hours, or on any
public or private property for a period in excess of seven calendar days
without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful
possession or control of the property.
(b)
It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or permit any scrap metal,
dismantled, junk, wrecked, abandoned, or inoperable vehicle(s) or vehicle
parts to remain on any property or premises, unless in connection with a
lawfully situated and licensed business, or in an enclosed accessory structure,
such as a garage or barn, provided such building does not impose a threat to

life safety or a nuisance or health hazard and is constructed in accordance
with all municipal ordinances and state building code and zoning regulations
at the time of the original building construction. Carports are not considered
"enclosed" for the purpose of this ordinance,
(c)
Any abandoned or inoperable vehicle(s) on a person's private property and
not owned by him may be removed upon the property owner's request,
provided proper Departmental authorization has been granted the wrecker.
(11.2)
(3) Cleaning required for vacated premises. Any person vacating a dwelling, storeroom, or
any other structure or the immediate grounds shall remove all garbage, trash and refuse and leave
the property in a sanitary condition within 24 hours after vacating. (11.3)
(4) Removal of dead animals. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly permit any
dead animal to remain upon the premises, or for the owner of any dead animal to knowingly permit
it to remain upon any public street or property or private premises. If the owner of the dead animal
does not remove and properly dispose of it himself or cause it to be properly removed and properly
disposed within 24 hours after receipt of notice from the Department, the Department may cause it
to be removed and disposed and shall assess against the owner the actual costs of removal and
disposal. The Department may avail itself of all remedies in law to enforce removal, disposal and
recovery of cost. If ownership of the dead animal cannot be determined, the owner of the property
on which the dead animal is located shall be responsible for proper removal and disposal of the
animal, and the assessing and recovering of costs shall apply to the property owner. (11.4)
(5) Compost. A person may keep or maintain compost on his property for home gardening
if the following requirements are complied with:
(a)
The compost shall be located and maintained to prevent the spread of disease,
the propagation or harborage of insects or rodents, the creation of any odor
or nuisance, or any other condition that might affect the public health, safety
or welfare.
(b)
The compost shall not be used or sold as a commercial product or used in any
licensed business operation unless the requirements of approval, permits, and
operation given in Sections 24-2-109 and 24-2-114 of these regulations are
complied with. (11.5)
(6) Handbills and leaflets. Every person distributing commercial handbills, leaflets, flyers,
advertising or information material shall prevent these materials from littering public or private
property. (11.6)
(7) Containers provided to prevent litter. To facilitate proper disposal of litter by pedestrians
and motorists, public establishments and institutions shall provide adequate containers that are
emptied and maintained in good condition and meet the prescribed standards in these regulations.
The requirements shall be applicable, but not limited to, fast-food outlets, shopping centers,
convenience stores, supermarkets, service stations, commercial parking lots, mobile canteens,
motels, hospitals, schools and colleges. (11.7)
(8) Construction and demolition projects.
(a)
It shall be unlawful for the owner, agent or contractor in charge of any
construction or demolition project to cause, maintain, permit or allow to be
caused, maintained or permitted the accumulation of any litter on the site
before, during or after completion of the construction or demolition project.

(b)

It shall be the duty of the owner, agent or contractor to have on the site
adequate containers for the disposal of litter and to make appropriate
arrangements for its collection or final disposition at an authorized facility.
(c)
It shall be unlawful for the owner, agent, or contractor in charge of any
construction or demolition project to place, for City-furnished bulky waste
collection, waste from construction and demolition projects.
(d)
The owner, agent or contractor may be required by the Department to show
proof of appropriate collection, or if personally transported, of final
disposition at an authorized facility. (11.8)
(9) Loading and unloading operations.
(a)
Any owner or occupant of an establishment or institution where litter is
attendant to the packing or unpacking or loading or unloading of materials at
exterior locations shall provide suitable containers for the disposal and
storage of such litter.
(b)
It shall be the duty of such owner or occupant to remove at the end of each
working day any litter that has not been containerized at exterior locations.
(11.9)
(10) Keeping property clean.
(a)
It shall be the duty of the owner or occupant to keep property free of litter.
This requirement applies not only to removal of loose litter, but to materials
that are or become trapped at fence and wall bases, grassy and planted areas,
borders, embankments or other lodging points.
(b)
The owner or occupant whose property faces on municipal sidewalks, strips
between streets and sidewalks, or strips between such properties and streets
shall be responsible for keeping those sidewalks and strips free of litter.
(c)
It shall be unlawful to sweep or push litter from sidewalks and steps into
streets. Sidewalk and step sweepings shall be picked up and put into
household or commercial solid waste containers. (11.10)

24-8-105.

REAL PROPERTY TO BE KEPT CLEAN AND SECURED.

It shall be unlawful for any person owning or occupying real property within West Valley
City, after receiving written notice from the Department to fail:
(1) To maintain the height of weeds on the property, including adjacent parking strip(s),
alley(s) and street edge(s) as required in Section 24-8-106. (5.1)
(2) To remove from the property and lawfully dispose of all cuttings from weeds or solid
waste. (5.2)
(3) To effectively secure any vacant structure. (5.3)
(4) To maintain or repair any unsightly or deleterious objects or structures, as defined in this
Chapter. (5.4)
(5) To remove from the property and lawfully dispose of any unsightly or deleterious objects
or structures. (5.5)
(6) To remove or obliterate any graffiti from or on any structure located upon any real
property within the City, when the graffiti is visible from the street or other public or private
property.

